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In re Parental Rights as to A.D.L., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 72 (Oct. 5, 2017)1
FAMILY LAW: PARENTAL RIGHTS
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court held that (1) requiring a parent to admit guilt to a criminal act
in order to maintain his or her parental rights violates that parent’s Fifth Amendment rights; and
(2) substantial evidence must demonstrate that terminating parental rights is in the best interest of
the children when a parent overcomes the presumptions in NRS 128.109(1)-(2).
Background
In April 2010, an anonymous person called respondent Clark County Department of Family
Services (DFS) through its child abuse hotline alleging that Keaundra’s children were being abused
and neglected because Keaundra’s infant child’s face had been burned. DFS investigated the
allegations by interviewing Keaundra. During the initial interview, Keaundra explained that
C.L.B., Jr. burned his face while Keaundra was preparing for work. She had left a hot iron on a
dresser in the master bedroom. Keaundra’s two children, A.D.L. and C.L.B. Jr., remained in the
master bedroom unsupervised. Keaundra heard the iron fall and came out of the adjacent bathroom
to find that C.L.B., Jr. had been burned. A.D.L. told Keaundra that C.L.B., Jr. had “tried to kiss
the iron.” Keaundra called her mother, a nurse, who advised Keaundra to put ointment on the injury
and take C.L.B. Jr. to the emergency room if the burn blistered.
Following the initial interview, DFS removed the children from Keaundra’s custody. Once
the children were removed from Keaundra’s custody, Dr. Thomas A. Neuman, a physician,
examined C.L.B., Jr.’s burn. Dr. Neuman determined that the injury healed well and did not find
any evidence of abuse. In May 2010, DFS filed a petition for protective custody of A.L.D. and
C.L.B. Jr. Keaundra entered a denial at the plea hearing. DFS responded by requesting that the
children be placed with their maternal grandmother.
At the following adjudicatory hearing, the hearing master admitted Dr. Neha Mehta’s
testimony as a medical examiner regarding his professional opinion of C.L.B. Jr.’s injuries. Dr.
Mehta reviewed photographs of the injuries and reported that the shape of the injury was
inconsistent with an accident. He believed the iron had been intentionally held to C.L.B. Jr.’s face.
Keaundra attempted to rebut Dr. Mehta’s testimony by offering Dr. Neuman’s report. However,
the hearing master excluded Dr. Neuman’s report because the report was not a certified copy.
Therefore, the hearing master concluded that Keaundra physically abused C.L.B. Jr., had
medically neglected him, and had absconded. The hearing master recommended that the abuse and
neglect petition be sustained and that A.D.L. and C.L.B. Jr. remain in DFS custody. The juvenile
court considered and affirmed the hearing master’s recommendation.
Following the juvenile court’s decision, Keaundra received a case plan that required her to
maintain stable housing and income, complete parenting classes, and maintain contact with DFS.
Keaundra was also required to complete a physical abuse assessment and “be able to articulate in
dialogue with the Specialist and therapist(s) the sequence of events which result[ed] in physical
abuse, as sustained by the Court, and how he/she will be able to ensure that no future physical
abuse to [C.L.B.] Jr. occurs.”
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One month later, DFS filed a petition to terminate Keaundra’s parental rights. Over the
following six months, Keaundra demonstrated that she completed the parenting classes,
maintained housing, had steady employment, and completed her assessment and therapy. DFS was
satisfied with Keaundra’s progress and recorded that she had “successfully completed her case
plan and has the knowledge and tools to effectively parent her children.” Nonetheless, DFS
continued to recommend that Keaundra’s parental rights be terminated because she failed to admit
that she abused C.L.B. Jr. when she held an iron to his face. Despite Keaundra’s nearly perfect
compliance with the case plan, the district court terminated Keaundra’s parental rights to both
children based on the hearing master’s recommendation and Keaundra’s failure to remedy the
“circumstances, conduct, or conditions” that lead to C.L.B. Jr.’s removal. Further, the district court
terminated her parental rights because of her “token efforts, failure of parental adjustment, and
unfitness.”
Keaundra immediately appealed that decision to the Court. The Court reversed the district
court’s holding because it failed to admit Dr. Neuman’s report and remanded the case for a new
trial on parental fault and the consideration of additional evidence. At the second trial, the district
court admitted Dr. Neuman’s report, and Dr. Mehta once again testified. The district court
reaffirmed its prior decision to terminate Keaundra’s parental rights largely because Dr. Mehta
had credentials and compelling testimony that supported Keaundra deliberately placing the iron
on C.L.B. Jr.’s face. Notably, the district court concluded that Keaundra “continued to insist that
the burn was accidental in nature in spite of all physical evidence being to the contrary.” Keaundra
appealed the district court’s holding.
Discussion
The district court’s termination of Keaundra’s parental rights constituted a violation of her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination provides that “[n]o person… shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”2 The Fifth Amendment protects
individuals in civil proceedings from self-incrimination when answering official questions in any
proceeding.3 Further, The United States Supreme Court has held that a state may not compel an
individual to choose between the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and another
principal interest because “such a choice is inherently coercive.”4 Founded on the belief that “the
parent-child relationship is a fundamental liberty interest,” the Nevada Supreme Court (“the
Court”) emphasized that the termination of parental rights must be highly regarded.5
Although the state maintains an important interest in protecting the welfare of children, 6
the Court agreed with various jurisdictions that the state may not threaten the loss of parental rights
to compel a parent to admit to a crime.7 The state’s role is limited to evaluating if a parent has
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See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V).
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
4
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805–08 (1977).
5
In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 801, 8 P.3d 126, 133 (2000).
6
See In re N.J., 116 Nev. at 802, 8 P.3d at 133; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.005(2)(c) (2017).
7
See, e.g., Dep’t of Human Servs. v. K.L.R., 230 P.3d 49, 54 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (“[R]equiring an admission of
abuse as a condition of family reunification violates a parent’s Fifth Amendment rights…”).
3
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adjusted circumstances to ensure the child’s safe return.8 Moreover, the Court can require a parent
to complete therapy as provided in a family reunification plan but the Court cannot explicitly
require a parent to admit guilt.9 Courts violate a parent’s Fifth Amendment right when the parent
is required to directly admit guilt or through a therapy program that mandates an admission of guilt
to achieve family reunification.10
The Court focused on DFS’s six-month record that demonstrated Keaundra’s success in
therapy which occurred without Keaundra’s admission of guilt. Despite Keaundra’s success in all
aspects of her case plan, except the required admission of guilt, Keaundra could not fully comply
with the case plan without admitting she committed a criminal act.11 Therefore, the district court
violated Keaundra’s Fifth Amendment rights by terminating her parental rights when she refused
to admit she intentionally caused C.L.B. Jr.’s injury. 12
There was not substantial evidence to support the district court’s decision to terminate Keaundra’s
parental rights
For the second question, DFS must provide clear and convincing evidence that (1)
terminating the parental rights is in the child’s best interest and; (2) parental fault exists. 13
Additionally, the termination of parental rights is subject to strict scrutiny because it “is an exercise
of awesome power that is tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty.”14 Thus, the Court
seeks substantial evidence when evaluating the district court’s findings of fact because parental
rights are highly regarded.
The district court abused its discretion in concluding that terminating Keaundra’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests
A parent may rebut NRS 128.109(2)’s presumption by providing a preponderance of
evidence that termination is not in the child’s best interest.15 The Court weighs the interests of the
children with the interests of the parents when deciding whether to terminate parental
rights.16Additionally, NRS 128.107(2) requires the district court to consider the “physical, mental
or emotional condition and needs of the child and the child’s desires regarding the termination, if
the court determines the child is of sufficient capacity to express his or her desires.”17
The Court found that the district court failed to consider the “physical, mental, or emotional
condition and needs” of the children. Further, the record reflected a preponderance of evidence
establishing that Keaundra rebutted NRS 128.109(2)’s presumption as demonstrated by her
8

See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.107(3) (2017); In re M.C.P., 571 A.2d 627, 640 (Vt. 1989).
In re A.W., 896 N.E.2d 316, 326 (Ill. 2008); In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Iowa 2002); In re J.W., 415
N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. 1987) (“While the state may not compel therapy treatment that would require appellants to
incriminate themselves, it may require the parents to otherwise undergo treatment.”).
10
In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d at 150; In re P.M.C., 902 N.E.2d 197, 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
11
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.508 (2015).
12
See In re J.W., 415 N.W.2d at 882–83.
13
In re Parental Rights as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 1423, 148 P.3d 759, 762 (2006).
14
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15
In re Parental Rights as to J.D.N., 128 Nev. 462, 472, 283 P.3d 842, 849 (2012); see NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 128.109(2) (2017) (establishing a presumption that terminating the parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best
interest when the child has been placed outside the home for 14 of any consecutive months).
16
In re N.J., 116 Nev. at 802, 8 P.3d at 134.
17
NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.107(2) (2017).
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financial support, regular contact with the children, and A.D.L.’s heightened desire to be reunited
with her mother. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in determining that
terminating Keaundra’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest.
The district court abused its discretion in concluding that there was clear and convincing
evidence of parental fault
Parental fault is determined by considering factors such as whether a parent is unfit or
failed to adjust,18 or merely made “token efforts” to maintain contact or support the child, prevent
child neglect, be a fit parent, or “eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or emotional injury
to the child.”19 The Court presumes that a parent made only token efforts when the child is placed
outside the home “for 14 months of any 20 consecutive months.”20 Further, a parent fails to adjust
to the circumstances when the parent does not substantially comply with the terms of the case plan
to reunite the family within six months after the children were placed or the case plan
commenced.21
The Court emphasized that Keaundra maintained housing and employment, maintained
contact with her children and DFS, provided financial support for her children, and complied with
the mandated assessment and therapy to the therapist’s satisfaction. Notably, even DFS admitted
that Keaundra was equipped with the proper knowledge and tools to parent the children. Aside
from Keaundra refraining from the admission of physical abuse, she completed with the case plan
in all regards. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in finding that Keaundra did not rebut
the presumptions in NRS 128.109(1)(a) when the preponderance of evidence in the record clearly
revealed otherwise.
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court will not terminate a parent’s rights solely because the parent
refuses to admit abuse because a forced admission violates the parent’s Fifth Amendment right.
The district court violated Keaundra’s Fifth Amendment right when it terminated her parental
rights solely because she refused to admit she caused C.L.B. Jr.’s injury. Further, the district court
lacked substantial evidence to establish that terminating Keaundra’s parental rights was in the best
interest of the children. Keaundra provided a preponderance of evidence to successfully rebut NRS
128.109(1) and (2). Thus, the Court reversed the district court’s order terminating Keaundra’s
parental rights.
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105(1)(b)(3) (2017).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105(1)(b)(6)(I)-(IV) (2017).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.109(1)(a) (2015).
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